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Abstract. The aim of the study was to answer the question whether there are universal norms of customary 
international law governing the immunity of international organisations and their property and address the 
obstacles to the development of the UN Convention governing the immunity of international organisations. 
Through comparative legal analysis, the Author proves that state immunities result from international and national 
laws. In the case of immunities derived from international law, there are no universal standards defining the scope 
of the jurisdiction immunity of a state and its property. Jurisdictional immunity of international organisations has 
as its only source international law (many states also regulate the issue in their domestic law). The study showed 
that international regulations move in contradictory directions: as regards the states, there is a move away from 
absolute immunity, while for international organisations the expansion of the catalogue of authorized immunity 
and its scope is observed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this legal analysis is a review of the institution of ‘immunity of an international 
organisation’ in functional dimension. Immunity of an international organisation is the 
normative groundwork for one of the three regimes of international immunities in the 
catalogue – state immunity, head of state and member of government immunity, and 
diplomatic immunity. I, therefore, extract a part from the whole for this analysis, but the 
extraction is incomplete and inconsistent. What connects the types of immunities is their 
effect, the result of implementation. They differ, among other reasons, in origin and 
function. Immunity of an international organisation has no past and has not been shaped, 
unlike state immunity, by a historical process, but is the result of a known institution (state 
immunity) being adapted for new needs. A well-known institution was then ‘extracted’ from 
its historical and functional context and, after slight modification, used to fulfil completely 
different social needs. The difference: having or not having roots is not decisive, however, 
that is essential for presenting discussing research problem. That difference is an idea and 
the fundamental of main research problem. The key is the difference in the subject of 
authorisation and the function between the immunity of an international organisation and 
state immunity, as well as the function-goal of the conferred immunity. The beneficiary of 
state immunity is the very state. State immunity protects the state and is a protective 
umbrella above it. The real beneficiaries of immunity of an international organisation are its 
members in a way and in many cases also other members of the international community. 
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Immunity of an international organisation protects its members – it is the umbrella above 
them. State immunity serves the subject, it ensures inequality of treatment. Evidently, this 
inequality is desirable by the international community (otherwise international state 
immunity wouldn’t exist), for by this, sui generis ‘iron letter’ states are encouraged to go 
beyond their own territories by giving them a warranty of safety. Each state and international 
society as a whole says to a state one can go outside without fear that infringing the law 
will put you in front of a tribunal in a place where one may commit a legally forbidden act 
or where one would bear its consequences. The message is clear: respect of the law will not 
be carried out in the universally accepted legal regime. This is obviously not identical with 
acceptance of breaking the law – immunity does not exempt from the obligation to respect 
the law but merely sets aside the possibility of a court execution of a law towards an 
infringing state in a third country.
State immunity deactivates territorial jurisdiction (outside of its borders). Both the 
states and the international community, however, have at their disposal other instruments 
(apart from those excluded or deactivated by immunity) for encouraging other states to 
respect the law and other regimes of action in case of infringement of the law. It is sufficient 
to indicate the benefits that a state respectful of the law will have in international circulation 
on one hand, and the refusal to confer such benefits as a consequence of infringement of the 
law on the other hand, to make it obvious that the immunity does not encourage neglect of 
the law and neither does it balance the negative consequences of infringement (from the 
concerned state’s standpoint). International organisation immunity is at the service of 
everybody, it ensures equality and protects each member of the organisation and all of them 
as a whole against the potential to influence any of them through instruments of law in 
order to obtain unilateral benefits. An international organisation is not exempted from the 
duty to respect the law. State and international organisation immunities also elicit different 
final outcomes. A state making use of its immunity outside of its borders is not entitled to 
immunity within its own territory and takes full legal responsibility within the territory 
demarcated by its own borders. An international organisation making use of its immunity is 
not legally responsible anywhere. State immunity extends towards the territorial jurisdiction 
of another/other states; organisation immunity extends towards any jurisdiction (national or 
international).
2. FIELD OF STUDY
Jurisdictional immunities of the subjects of international law are institutions created as a 
result of multiple splits of immunity of sovereign-state into institutions,1 out of which, some 
have encompassed inner relationships and some have covered the outside aspect of the 
functioning of a state–its international relations.2 In practice, the norm of national law, 
jurisdictional immunity of a sovereign-state (acknowledged by national legal regimes), 
coveres the range of subjects, exterior to the sovereign and independent from it but is 
1 Tak, et al (2004), see also Hanrahan (2005).
2 At the source there was diversified practice, such as the conflict preceding the British Act 
Preserving the Privileges of Ambassadors from 1708 (the act became an international model and was 
repeated, among others, in the American regulation from 1790); see also, the entry ‘extraterritoriality’, 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/199129/extraterritoriality> accessed 31 July 2017.
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considered equal in the eyes of the law,3 that resulted from the appearance of the sovereign 
in international circulation,4 and, as a consequence, this norm become (also) a norm of 
international law.5 In order to justify the immunities, the concepts of personal or functional 
exteriority were conjured. However, it can be simply stated, and this is exclusively decisive 
in the Westphalian order, that jurisdictional immunity in international legal circulation is 
coupled with the sovereignty and equality of the state. The essence of the sovereignty, of 
being a sovereign, is the lack of subordination to any other authority, this is not identical to 
a lack of subordination towards the law. The execution of jurisdiction always means 
execution authority, or supremacy.6 Jurisdictional immunity7 is then understood in the large 
sense, as a lack of subordination to an external jurisdiction,8 ‘exemption from the application 
or jurisdiction of local law or tribunals’,9 ‘immunity of a foreign sovereign, its agents, and 
its instrumentalities from litigation in U.S. courts’10 and the jurisdiction of authority of 
another subject.11 This rule may be expressed by the classic sentence, par in parem non 
habet imperium.12
  3 For a justification of the concept of absolute immunity, see the opinion of US Supreme Court 
Justice Marshall in The Schoonere Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. 116 (1812) <http://supreme.justia.
com/us/11/116/case.html> accessed 31 July 2017, In the case of The Schoonere Exchange v. 
McFadden, the legal status of national ships (the status of the ships was evened up) was regulated 
differently from the status designed by the Brussels Convention from 1926; see Steiner, Vagts and 
Hongju Koh (1994) 757–62.
  4 For more, see: Second Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, by 
Sompong Sucharitkul, Special Rapporteur (pp. 214 and 215), <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/
yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1980_v2_p1_e.pdf > accessed 31 July 2017.
  5 It is generally agreed that the term was introduced to the International Law Dictionary at the 
end of the 18th c. by G. F. von Martens. P. Ayraut is considered the father of the concept that was 
developed later by H. Grocjusz and S. von Pufendorf; see the definition of ‘Extraterritoriality’ in: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2008, Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. <http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/199129/extraterritoriality> accessed 31 July 2017.
  6 According to Cassese, immunity is not an expression of sovereignty but a limitation of 
sovereignty Cassese (2001) 91.
  7 The entry ‘immunity’ is generally defined as: ‘Any exemption from a duty, liability, or service 
of process’, in: Black (1999).
  8 For instance, the International Law Commission: ‘‛Immunity’ is a legal concept which can be 
expressed in terms of a jural relationship. Just as a ‛right’ is correlated to a corresponding ‛duty’ 
incumbent on another party, ‛immunity’ to which a person or party or State is entitled is correlated to 
‛no power’ on the part of the corresponding authority. It signifies absence or lack of power, or 
necessity to withhold or suspend the exercise of such power. In other words, the expression ‛immunity’ 
connotes the non-existence of power or non-amenability to the jurisdiction of the national authorities 
of a territorial State’, Black (1999) 204.
  9 Merriam Webster’s Dictionary of Law.
10 Entry ‘foreign immunity’, in: Black (1999).
11 From this understanding of jurisdiction of authority of another subject is excluded (at least 
since constitution and acknowledgement of the PCIJ jurisdiction) jurisdiction of international tribunals 
and courts, above all the ICJ and other specialized court organs. Also excluded in terms of jurisdiction 
are state-members of the organisation – executed by court organs of international organisations. ICC 
property constitutes a particular case. 
12 See Rapport ILC (p. 159): ‘The doctrine of State immunity is the result of an interplay of two 
fundamental principles of international law: the principle of territoriality and the principle of State 
personality, both being aspects of State sovereignty. Thus, State immunity is sometimes expressed in 
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Other subjects of international law, IGOs, some NGOs such as the ICRC as well as 
states, are entitled to court immunity.
The roots of the institution are planted, and this is important for further considerations,in 
the ‘national’ status of the sovereign. The successor of this status was, and to a limited 
extent (such as no submission to the jurisdiction of a third country) still is, the state. 
Nevertheless, the sovereign lost immunity in the internal sphere. This occurred within the 
evolution of authority from the status of emperor-absolute ruler in Byzantium, who was 
‘the supreme judge, the head of administration and army’ towards the order of the rule of 
law. The final point in the evolution dated to the end of the 18th century and is symbolically 
expressed by the legend of the ‘miller of Sanssouci’.13
In the case of international organisations, there are no historic connotations or 
justifications for the institution of immunity. Their juristic immunity at its core was and still 
is functional immunity. The immunity had its purpose to protect and fortify the independence 
of the international organisation in its internal actions from a state or states in case of an 
attempt to influence the organisation’s actions in a mode unregulated by the law, that is, to 
undermine its independence.14 In 1931, the Italian Cessation Court proved this by stating in 
the case Profili v. International Institute of Agriculture that there was a lack of jurisdictional 
authority over the institute as a subject of international law as it was equipped with full 
autonomy in the internal sphere and an interdependent freedom from the authority of any 
state either territorial or personal supremacy.15
3. CONTENT OF THE NORM
Based on the praxis, it cannot be unequivocally stated whether jurisdictional absolute 
immunity has been narrowed to a limited extent; if new forms of state activity have not 
been covered; whether absolute immunity is classical16 or that what is classical is solely 
jure imperii17 actions. Two directions were equally justified were in the legislation, one to 
confer universal character to the practice sanctioning – the absolute jurisdictional immunity 
of the state and other subjects, and the other, the same measure with respect to limited 
immunity (with designed grounds for limitation). The matter of jurisdictional immunity of a 
state and its property was codified, as numerous states wished to sanction changes in their 
own domestic legal systems (US,18 UK19); some wished to confer universal character to 
the maxim par in parem imperium non habet’, <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/
Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1978_v2_p2_e.pdf> accessed 31 July 2017. 
13 More Parish (2010) 18 and following.
14 More: Rule of Law. International Immunity. Centre for Accountability of International 
Organisations, <http://www.caio-ch.org/RuleofLaw.html> accessed 31 July 2017.
15 Text: ‘Annual Digest of Public International Law Case’ 1929–1930, ‘International Law 
Reports’, pp. 413–15.
16 For analysis of the praxis, see: J. B. Tate (Acting Legal Adviser) in the document from 19th of 
May 1952, called the ‘Tate Letter’, directed to P. B. Perlman (Acting Attorney General), <http://
caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=425&invol=682> accessed 31 July 2017. 
17 The basis for this division is the doctrine of an ‘act of State’, which was analysed in the case 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, and earlier in the cases Underhill v. Hernandez and Oetjen v. 
Central Leather Co.
18 By the power of Section 1604 from the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.
19 According to Article 1 of the State Immunity Act of 1978.
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their own practice (Europe20), as there was/is conflict not only between the subjects of 
international law but also among other international actors over the content and range of 
international immunities (not only jurisdictional) and the catalogue of entitled immunities.
The conflict is characterized by its changing and constantly high growth, and it 
engagement to an important degree the interest of public opinion and concerns fundamental 
questions. On one hand, we deal partly with defence of the capacity to act in international 
relations – the law recognizing the value of functionalism (defence of immunity) and a law/
postulate invoking moral axiology, that is, equality before the law (the limitation of 
immunity at least).
In a nutshell may it can be said that limited immunity threatens circulation or absolute 
immunity threatens the law or values of law identified with the law such as equality and it 
is in unavoidability way goes to the dysfunctional of application of legal norms.21 It is 
doubtless, however, that the position resulting from accepting the United Nations 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property22 and its lack of entry 
into force is particularly bad. The situation reveals both the lack of a universal regime of 
jurisdictional immunity of a state (and of other subjects of international law) and its property 
and an incapacity or at least serious difficulties in producing a universal standard. The 
protagonists of the legislative direction aimed at limited jurisdictional immunity reflected in 
the Convention, proved their strength and capacity without achieving victory, the entering 
into force of the Convention. What is more, none of the permanent members of the Security 
Council ratified the Convention and four out of the five only signed it. The main supporter 
of this direction of codification, the US did not do that. The US attitude may signify that it 
did not expect the Convention to enter into force or display a mindset to act unilaterally in 
reference to jurisdictional immunity of subjects of international law and their property or a 
larger, negative attitude towards progressive development and codification of international 
law in the institutionalized formula of the UN.23 At the same time, the failure of the 
Convention, which primarily codified the norms in force, did not create a legal vacuum.
A. Precedents for a departure from absolute immunity
It is undeniable that the idea of limitation of jurisdictional immunity of a state has not 
appeared as deus ex machina in the second half of the 20th century. The absolute 
jurisdictional immunity of a state was already seriously undermined by Institut du Droit 
International during its session in Cambridge in 1895.24 The decisive argument in favour of 
20 ‘Considering the fact, that in the international law there is a tendency to limit the number of 
cases [underlined by J. M.], in which the State can invoke the immunity against foreign courts’, 
European Convention on State Immunity, Basel 16.05.1972.
21 States ILC in points 12 and 13 of the Report (p. 159), <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/
yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1978_v2_p2_e.pdf> accessed 31 July 2017.
22 Also: European Convention on State Immunity, Basel, 16. 05. 1972. <https://www.coe.int/en/
web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/074> accessed 31 July 2017.
23 Article 13 Charter of United Nations.
24 See the limitations in Article 16 with reference to the general regulation: Règlement sur les 
immunités diplomatiques:
L’immunité de juridiction ne peut être invoqué:
1° En cas de poursuites exercées à raison d’engagements contractés par la personne exempte, non en 
sa qualité officielle ou privée, mais dans l’exercice d’une profession exercée par elle dans le pays 
concurremment avec ses fonctions diplomatiques;
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the change, however, culminated in the processes that took place in the 20th century Socialist 
countries undertaking profit-oriented activity (production and trade) while aspiring to have 
both the benefits of the entitlements of a legal entity in trade and still be protected by 
jurisdictional immunity from any responsibility related with participation in trade. 
Nevertheless, these problems and phenomena, even if not entirely historic, are not the focus 
of public attention and they are not reasons to undermine norms composing jurisdictional 
immunity of the subjects of international law. The centre of attention constitutes cases of 
abuse of immunity, particularly diplomatic immunity, of a criminal nature with the 
participation of states, their diplomatic representatives, and of international organisations – 
their officials. These events of various gravity but composing a unified image of abuse of 
the law25 encounter decisive resistance: scandals that came to be known as ‘Oil for Food’26 
and ‘Sex for Food’27 – the protection against charges of 15 counts of rape against the son of 
a diplomat accredited in the US (1983); charges of sexual abuse by the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Ruud Lubbers;28 the scale and high level of avoidance of 
financial commitments, such as debts, alimony and family benefits,29 the scale and gravity 
of this phenomenon is well illustrated by it becoming a topic of discussion during the 
Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 in Beijing;30 the murder of policewoman 
Yvonne Fletcher, who was hit after gunfire from the window of Libya’s embassy in London 
(1984); the real threat of accidents in traffic, well-illustrated by the nickname for the 
phenomenon – Diplomatenrennbahn (diplomats’ race track) given to the highway near 
Bonn; fatal accidents caused by diplomats (Silviu Ionescu from Romania, Geuorgui 
Makharadze from Georgia, Andrei Knyazev from Russia, or Douglas Kent from the US) 
and disdain for the law as seen in unpaid parking fees.31
2° En matière d’actions réelles, y compris les actions possessoires, se rapportant à une chose,
meuble ou immeuble, qui se trouve sur le territoire.
Elle subsiste, même en cas de contravention dangereuse pour l’ordre ou la sécurité publique ou de 
crime attentatoire à la sûreté de l’État, sans préjudice du droit pour le gouvernement territorial de 
prendre telles mesures conservatoires qu’il appartiendra (art. 6, 3°)
<http://www.idi-iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/1895_camb_01_fr.pdf.> accessed 31 July 2017.
25 For more, see: Flaherty (2003) also Parish (2010) 6 and following. 
26 The abuses revealed in the Volcker Report directly charged UN General Secretary Kofi A. 
Annan, but also the entire organisation. The impulse that led to the revealing of the crimes was given 
by an investigation initiated in 2005 by Robert Morgenthau on highly ranked UN official Benon 
Sevan (a Cypriot citizen); for more, see: Anderson (2010). 
27 This term is used for the series of crimes/scandals in which people hired by UNHCR in Sierra 
Leone, Liberia and Guinea perpetrated sex crimes (including rapes) on young women who were 
refugees in exchange for food. 
28 For more, see: Goodenough (2010).
29 The case ‘Barbara Elzohairy’ became symbolic of this (she was the wife of an Egyptian 
representative to the UN) as was the case ‘Fernandez v. Fernandez’ (involving the divorce of a US 
citizen and a Mozambique representative to the UN). 
30 For more, see the entry ‘Diplomatic Immunity’ in: West (2005).
31 In February 1995, the mayor of New York, Rudolph Giuliani, disclosed diplomatic arrears of 
800 000 USD.
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B. Next steps
If the first step (that is, the Convention) has been taken, even though we do not know 
whether it is a step towards a new, universal normative order as far as immunity is concerned 
or towards the unveiling and deepening of differences in legal standards among states, then 
regulation defined by subjects and needs must follow. The subject of public international 
law, other than states, such as IGOs and NGOs, need codification of their correspondent 
jurisdictional immunities and for their property even more than states.32 They also need 
codification of other immunities33 as well as an answer to the question of whether their 
jurisdictional immunity (but not only in this instance) can be larger than the jurisdictional 
immunity of a state. The scale of this challenge, not only for every state but also for the 
entire international community and each international organisation, is decided by the 
number of active international organisations (in every state34) and the dynamics of the 
process of granting immunity, including jurisdictionally, to the following organisations.35 
Nevertheless, these very significant problems and challenges do not exhaust the topic of the 
study. I also am intenting to examine the existence of universal norms in the international 
law praxis that regulate the matter of immunity of international organisations and their 
property, with the basis in repetitive regulations in individual contracts.36
C. Thesis
The thesis of the present research is the lack of universal norms of international law praxis, 
regulating jurisdictional immunity of a state and its property, the fact of annihilating 
previously existing ones by modification of factual states and the organic inability to work 
out a universal regulation in reference to each international organisation. This organic 
inability results from non-homogeneity of the ‘IO’ category and appears even in sub-
categories: IGOs, while entitled by jurisdictional immunity are also organisations devoid of 
stricte international character (such as INTERPOL), but most of all, ICRC-NGO. The 
author has a basic doubt whether the initial statement of the Convention’s preamble can be 
applied with respect to international organisations: ‘Considering that the jurisdictional 
immunities of States and their property are generally accepted as a principle of customary 
32 For convergent opinions, see Gaillard and Pingel-Lenuzza (2002) 1–15. 
33 In relation to ILC states, correspondent codification work is conducted.
34 It is estimated that in the US, there are 75 international organisations entitled under the 
International Organisations Immunities Act (IOIA), among which we find well-known organisations 
such as NZ System and the ICRC, but also more ‘exotic’ ones such as the International Commission 
of Pacific Halibut, Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria. Around 25 000 international officials live and work in Geneva, out of 
which over 60% are hired on short-term contracts (3–6 months). 
35 The status of INTERPOL is a good illustration: first, President Reagan declared it a public 
international organisation (Executive Order No. 12425 from 16.06.1983), followed by President 
Clinton, who exempted it from customs fees and granted it the right of tax return (Executive Order 
No. 12971 from 15. 09. 1995), and last, (17.12.2009), President Obama cleared it from all limitations 
under IOIA. In this trend to extend the list of organisations entitled under IOIA, there is no difference 
between Democrat or Republican administrations. 
36 In the case of the states, the Draft Declarations on the Rights and Duties of States from 1949 
confirmed it in Article 2 (‘Every State has the right to exercise jurisdiction over its territory and over 
all persons and things therein, subject to the immunities recognized by international law’), <http://
untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/2_1_1949.pdf> accessed 31 July 2017.
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international law’; that international organisations and their property are and should be 
entitled to jurisdictional immunity (before domestic courts) and if the international 
community would be inclined to accept such a norm by acknowledging the immunity of 
every organisation within a formally unified subset of IGOs extended to other organisations 
– beneficiaries of the same status ad casum.What would be the content of immunity 
exceptions in reference to the IOs and whether analogically, a general demarcation of its 
range as well as resignation from such demarcation is possible in the case of the future 
codification.
4. JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION, 
LEGAL STATE, RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NORM
In the situation of a lack of abstract and general norms which determine the content of the 
jurisdictional immunity of IOs,37 an exclusively ad casum examination is possible, by 
invoking regulations made in response to the needs of particular organisations38 followed 
by verification or revocation of the hypothesis assuming the existence of the model. Without 
returning to the past more than is necessary, it is important to indicate that in Section 2 of 
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, ‘The United 
Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy 
immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has 
expressly waived its immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall 
extend to any measure of execution’. Similarly, in reference to the jurisdictional immunity 
of specialised agencies, Article III of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the Specialized Agencies states: ‘The specialized agencies, their property and assets, 
wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal 
process except insofar as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity’, 
as the norm was repeated: ‘2. The United Nations, its property and assets wherever located 
and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except 
insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. It is, however, 
understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution’.
Obviously, in the case of breaking the unified, universal legal regime of the legal 
praxis of absolute state jurisdictional immunity as a result, decisively, of US actions, it is 
indispensable to examine the US position towards IO jurisdictional immunity. The 
examination is initiated by the statement that the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations entered into force in the US (only) on the 29th of April 
1970.39 Leaving aside, irrelevant in this case (and much larger), the question of the US 
attitude towards multilateral treaties and the range of jurisdictional immunity based on 
which the UN was privileged in the US, the most essential fact would be that the US 
acknowledged the UN’s absolute immunity already after the date by which through the 
‘Tate Letter’ rejected the right of a state to be privileged by such (absolute) immunity. As 
far as the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the 
UN is concerned, the US without being a party to it, deemed it necessary to file on the 8th of 
July 1975, a declaration referring to a GDR government declaration, derivative of the 
37 For more, see: Menkes and Wasilkowski (2010) 240–43.
38 Immunities and privileges are granted to organisations and defined by bilateral or multilateral 
contracts or by unilateral acts by states or international organisations. 
39 See: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organisation/143863.pdf> accessed 31 July 2017.
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accession of this country to the Convention. This Declaration also does not seem to discredit 
the range of the absolute jurisdictional immunity of specialized agencies.40 The Convention 
on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel was signed by the US on the 19th 
of December 1994 and despite the lack of ratification of the Convention, the US did not 
raise any objections to its Article 6, Paragraph 1, on such a significant matter.
This perpective is important of the accepting by the US , however, but the decisive 
character has the regulation comprised in the United States International Organizations 
Immunities Act (IOIA) from the 29th of December 1945, according to which ‘(b) 
International organizations, their property and their assets, wherever located, and by 
whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial 
process as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations 
may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of 
any contract’. It is without doubt that in 1945, in assigning jurisdictional immunity to 
international organisations ‘on the same bases as benefit the states’, signified the US was 
accrediting absolute immunity. It is also doubtless that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act (FSIA) from 1976 modified, to a limited extent, the range of the immunity of foreign 
states before American courts. Such a change in the range of jurisdictional immunity of a 
state and its property, however, does not automatically lead to a change to the range of 
jurisdictional immunity of an international organisation and its property as set forth under 
IOIA. The (US) legislature was familiar with the range of immunity as defined by IOIA and 
as a result, the range of immunity for a state and its property, and was able, while enacting 
FSIA, to make amendments to IOIA, to limit by rule the range of jurisdictional immunity 
accredited by the power of IOIA to international organisations to one accredited to a state. 
Potential doubts result from the modus operandi of the US legislature as it was applied in 
1945.
In order to define the content of the jurisdictional immunity of an international 
organisation, the construct was used of an empty form of a legal provision remanding to a 
well-known and severe provision defining the content of state jurisdictional immunity, 
which had, in that time, a series of advantages.
– accelerated regulation needed on US territory (considered future and in the uncertain 
event of an international convention);
– by remanding to a well-known and precise provision, it simplified the application of 
the law and prevented possible difficulties or controversial judicature;
– it unveiled the ratio legis of the legislature, which was to ensure unified treatment 
for all states and international organisations as far as jurisdictional immunity goes.
The price to be paid, however, came after 1976, despite the benefits obtained in 1945, 
is uncertainty with reference to the influence of the range of jurisdictional immunity of a 
state as determined by FSIA on the jurisdictional immunity of an international organisation 
as determined by IOIA.41 The ratio legis of the act from 1945 would speak to limitation of 
the immunity, a departure from absolute immunity, in good practice. However, the matter of 
a referral after the loss of binding force of the provision pertaining to the referral is regulated 
40 See: A declaration relating to the declaration made upon accession by the German Democratic 
Republic concerning application to Berlin (West). Registered ex officio on 8 July 1975, http://treaties.
un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20973/volume-973-A-521-English.pdf.
41 It is confirmed by controversies around judicature in American courts, for instance, in the 
case of Oss Nakalva v. European Space Agancy or Atkinson v. Inter-American Development Bank; for 
more, see: Hardcastle (2010).
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in the introductory provisions, with the awareness that, on the one hand, it would be difficult 
for a repealed provision to be binding on the referral while, on the other hand, the legal 
grounds to automatically transfer the referral to the new provision are missing. The 
abovementioned desired standard of carefulness required in domestic relations should be 
even higher in international relations when there are no grounds to require the external 
subject to follow the changes in domestic law.42 Additionally, the doctrine of the ‘act of 
State’43 that constitutes the base for the limitation of state jurisdictional immunity cannot be 
simply transferred to international organisations. While in the case of the states, ‘trade 
activity’ (Section 1603 FSIA) has generally the character of an act jure gestionis, it is 
certainly not the case generally for IOs.44
These regulations (both, the American blanket referral and the UN Convention) create 
a common international standard that allows us to state the existence of a universal norm of 
legal praxis regulating jurisdictional immunity of international organisations.
Universality of the norm is confirmed by the regulations in the contracts shaping the 
legal status of regional organisations; particularly in situations when, as parties to these 
contracts, appear states standing for rejection of absolute jurisdictional immunity of the 
state. Such is the case of the European Council, European Union and NATO:
– European Council. The legal basis for the immunity is Article 3 of the General 
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the European Council from the 2nd of September 
1949: ‘The Council, its property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular 
case, the Committee of Ministers has expressly authorized the waiver of this immunity.’
– European Union. Immunity is confirmed by the Protocol on Privileges and 
Immunities of European Communities from 8th of April 1965;
– NATO. According Article 5 of the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation, national representatives and international staff, from the 20th of 
September 1951: ‘The Organisation, its property and assets, wherever located and by 
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as 
in any particular case the Chairman of the Council Deputies, acting on behalf of the 
Organisation, may expressly authorize the waiver of this immunity’.
In reference to the jurisdictional immunity of international organisations and organs, 
not only ‘classical’ organisations, but larger, ‘international institutions’, he existence of a 
net of singular contracts can be confirmed and their coherent resolutions create in the 
matter, the standard of the absolute jurisdictional immunity of the international organisation 
and its property – the state of the universal legal praxis. This conclusion is confirmed also 
by the coherent standpoint of the doctrine.45
5. FINAL REMARKS
To sum up, it may be stated that in the case of state immunity, there is a question of whether 
the immunities are grounded in international law and in domestic law. In reference to state 
immunities grounded in international law, there is no universal norm defining the range of 
42 To what extent the legal state is haywire can be seen in the Diplomatic and Consular 
Privileges and Immunities from Criminal Jurisdiction Summary of Law Enforcement Aspects <http://
www.state.gov/documents/organisation/20047.pdf> accessed 31 July 2017. 
43 See: Lowenfeld (2002) 501 and following.
44 Illustrated by the case of the International Tin Council.
45 The Kirgis manual is representative of the situation, Kirgis (1993) 19–53.
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jurisdictional immunity or of property; the differences come not only from the gap between 
absolute and limited immunity but also from the range of the content of the limitation of the 
immunity. The creation of such norms of universal character also does not seem probable in 
the short-term or medium-term perspective.
Jurisdictional immunity of an international organisation has its sources exclusively in 
international law (while many states regulate the corresponding matter in domestic 
legislation). In the case of state immunity, it can be observed that an individualistic goal, 
protection by the law of the subject’s interest or – at best – a transaction do ut des, that is, 
immunity of an international organisation serves the common interest, driven by 
‘communitarianism’, decisions made by states abut granting them to international 
organisations are of an altruistic nature.
Simultaneously, in reference to a state, an argument for limitation of the immunities 
were and are abuses and the inability of a state to quickly and efficiently defend against 
such cases while a state entitlement to benefit from immunity is incontestable. This 
argument is invalid in the case of an international organisation. In the case of an international 
organisation, somehow ‘imperceptibly’ by small steps, the immunity has been extended 
over organisations with a dubious right to such privileged status. On the other hand, 
agreeing that the differences between the range of the conferred jurisdictional immunity of 
a state and its property should not be maintained as compared with international 
organisations, to the detriment of the state, then it is impossible to define the range of the 
content of limitations for the set of all the IOs and even for the subset of IGOs.
In spite of easy and spectacular enunciations, jurisdictional immunity as the subject of 
international law isn’t fas nor ne fas. It is morally neutral; it is good because it is in force. 
It is impossible to put jurisdictional immunity in international relations under a judgment 
from the moral axiology standpoint, but it is necessary to build it in, make ties with l’ordre 
public. The state is exempt from duties by jurisdictional immunity only before a foreign 
court but it cannot take advantage or invoke the immunity before its ‘own’ domestic court. 
This allows it to be stated that jurisdictional immunity protects from a complaint exclusively 
before a foreign state. The subject legitimized to file a complaint can do so before the state’s 
court (in this sense, jurisdictional immunity can be considered to be a procedural norm). 
The legal and factual state changes in reference to IOs,46 which do not possess courts 
(in this understanding); in their case, the lack of fori47 results in the lack of actio.48
46 According to Martin Nerisky, spokesman for UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon, enunciating 
on the Ruud Lubbers’ case: ‘As a general principle, I think you are aware of the general immunity that 
exists, […] I am not talking about specific cases or specific areas, but as a general rule’, quote from 
P. Goodenough (2010).
47 This complaint was expressed by Cynthia Brzak (in the case of Ruud Lubbers) in a letter to 
President Obama: ‘Since the United Nations internal justice system is not independent or credible, the 
use of diplomatic immunity to prevent U.N. staff access to national legal systems is morally repugnant 
and inconsistent with human rights norms, […] Moreover, many in the legal field also believe it to be 
unconstitutional’, quote from Goodenough (2010).
48 This opinion was shared by Nasr Ishak, chairman of UNHCR staff council, and his standpoint 
had strong grounds in a report by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Service (OIOS), which was 
pressured to stop publication of the report (Francis Montil, former deputy director of the United 
Nations’ internal investigation arm, quoted a high-ranking official under former UN General Secretary 
Kofi A. Annan: ‘[…] that the complainant was an American woman, and therefore a neurotic attention-
seeker who was no doubt exaggerating the incident’. 
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